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Abstract
This paper deals with the issue of the coordination of public debt management and 
running monetary policy in Croatia, and draws attention to the importance of this kind of 
coordination for macroeconomic stability.  Particular attention is paid to the management 
of public debt and the running of monetary policy in Croatia as practiced to date, and the 
problems that have arisen the while.   Also given are the most important measures that the 
Croatian National Bank has taken to make it easier to manage the public debt and achieve 
better coordination with the Finance Ministry. There is more detailed discussion of the in-
troduction of open market operations, the most important step taken towards better coor-
dination of the running of monetary policy and the management of the public debt. Since 
the introduction of open market operations, interest rates on the interbank market and on 
the government bonds market have oscillated far less and have stabilized at a lower lev-
el. This should facilitate public debt management and provide for greater predictability 
in the planning of debt management costs.  The final section discusses the importance of 
the further development of the government bonds market for the improvement of coordi-
nation in Croatia. The conclusion makes concrete proposals for the improvement of coor-
dination: the achievement of an at least approximate consensus about the optimum com-
bination of fiscal and monetary policy and the establishment of mechanisms for regular 
exchanges of information between the Finance Ministry and the Croatian National Bank 
for the purpose of harmonizing fiscal and monetary policy.
Key words: Croatia, public debt management, running monetary policy, government 
bonds market, open market operations
*   Received: March 30, 2007
Accepted: June 3, 2007
1 The views expressed in the paper are the personal views of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the institution in which she is employed.154
Z. Raspudić Golomejić: Coordination of Public Debt Management and Running Monetary Policy in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 31 (2) 153-183 (2007)
1 Introduction
Since the matter of coordination of public debt management and the running of mon-
etary policy has been insufficiently treated in scientific and professional-interest writing, 
and since practice shows that in fact it is very important, it seems a worthwhile challenge 
to endeavour to sum up certain aspects of this coordination.
The first part of the paper discusses the links between public debt management pol-
icy and monetary policy and their basic objectives. Also discussed is the meaning of the 
independence of the central bank in running monetary policy, and examples drawn from 
several countries of threats to the independence of the central banks are given.
In part two, several possible solutions are offered for the coordination of public debt 
management and the running of monetary policy, and attention is drawn to certain spe-
cific features of this coordination in transition and developed countries. Also briefly dis-
cussed are the most common causes of conflicts between public debt management poli-
cy and monetary policy.
Part three exhibits coordination to date of public debt management and monetary poli-
cy running in Croatia. The degree of Croatian National Bank (CNB) independence is eval-
uated, and there is a brief discussion of the main obstacles in the way of accomplishing 
better coordination of public debt management and running monetary policy in Croatia.
In the continuation the most important measures that the CNB has undertaken to fa-
cilitate management of the public debt and better coordination with the Finance Ministry, 
and detailed reference is made to the introduction of open market operations, the most 
important step taken towards coordination of running monetary policy and public debt 
management.
The fourth part deals with the importance of further development in the government 
securities market for the improvement of coordination in Croatia for it has turned out 
that coordination is much better in countries that have already carried out important fi-
nancial reforms, in which the government has reduced central government budget defi-
cit to a reasonable minimum and that have in addition a well developed market for gov-
ernment securities. 
In the final part of the work, pertinent proposals are made for the improvement of 
coordination between public debt management and the running of monetary policy in 
Croatia.
2 The connection of public debt management policy and monetary policy
There is no doubt that public debt management policy and monetary policy are con-
nected, and thus numerous papers have pointed out the importance of the structure of pub-
lic debt for being able to conduct an optimal monetary policy over the short- and long-term 
(Cosimano and Gapen, 2003). In many transition countries, it is the structure of the pub-
lic debt and not the level that is the chief reason for financial crises and general macroeco-
nomic instability (Mihaljek, 2002). When the structure of the debt is discussed, it is logi-
cal to ask what debt structure would be appropriate for the achievement of stable economic 
development in some country. The answer to this question is not easy to find and it on the 155
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whole depends on the direction and strength of the correlation between inflation, real eco-
nomic growth and interest rate (Missale, 2000). In his analysis, Missale concluded that for 
harmonisation with monetary policy, the basic objective of which is to preserve price sta-
bility, the optimal debt structure is a combination of long-term debt at a fixed rate of inter-
est and inflation-indexed debt. Such a combination of debts has a favourable effect on the 
stabilisation of the deficit, which is for him the basic objective of debt management.
2.1 Public debt management 
Public debt management can be defined briefly as a set of procedures undertaken and 
decisions made for the sake of obtaining the financial resources necessary for the govern-
ment. Some of the most important decisions adopted are concerned with the size of the 
debt, the debt servicing period, the currency structure and so on. It is highly important 
here to pay attention to the risks and costs that derive from such decisions.2 It is very im-
portant for every country to have a long-term debt management strategy, which should be 
developed with reference to the overall macroeconomic situation in the land.
The basic objective of public debt management policy in most countries is to meet 
the needs of the government for financial resources while taking on only a reasonable lev-
el of risk. However, in some countries, minimisation of the costs of debt management is 
privileged. A highly rated objective in many lands is active support to the macroeconom-
ic policy of the country. Many theorists think that debt management is also essential for 
the handling of taxation policy (Barro, 1997), for the existence of a debt gives the govern-
ment greater degree of freedom in running economic policy and reducing the effects of 
distorting taxes and the growth of the money supply, particularly in periods of economic 
shocks (Cosimano and Gapen, 2003). Still, it can be said that today, instead of the one-
time greater focus on the budget for the sake of avoiding major tax changes, debt manag-
ers are more attentive to reduction of interest charges on the public debt and to avoidance 
of major fluctuations in the trends in such costs (Wolswijk de Haan, 2005).
The legislative and institutional framework of public debt management must be such 
as to enable those charged with managing the debt to realise their objectives effectively. 
It should also provide investors with certain guarantees that funds invested will be safe. 
For the sake of the maximum degree of responsibility in the process of debt management, 
additional legislation is often passed to limit the amount of the public debt (Carracedo 
and Dattels, 1997).
2.1.1 Institutional arrangements for public debt management 
There are three basic institutional arrangements for public debt management.3
The finance ministry manages the public debt and is responsible for tactical, strate-
gic and many other functions (Slovenia, Italy). The central bank here is responsible only 
for technical aspects of debt management, such as the sale of debt instruments and run-
ning the system of payments and settlements. 
2 For more on this see IMF and World Bank (2003).
3 See: Carracedo and Dattels (1997).156
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The central bank has the most important role in formulating the debt management 
policy and is responsible for strategic policies and short-term public debt management 
(Denmark). This provides a certain degree of central bank discretion in debt management, 
which is important when it is wished to harmonise public debt management and the run-
ning of monetary policy.
Many functions of public debt management are carried out by a special debt manage-
ment office or agency (as in Sweden and Ireland). This is an approach that ensures total 
separation of fiscal and monetary policy from debt management policy. Such offices have 
on the whole been founded only in the last twenty years or so, always excepting Sweden, 
which has had such an office since 1789.
There are no strict rules for the division of given debt management functions. The fi-
nance ministry and central bank are always, to a greater or lesser degree, involved in debt 
management affairs, and in some countries, as well as them, debt management affairs are 
handled by an independent agency. The definition of the status of such an agency is not 
always very easy, and the degree to which it is really independent can vary, depending 
upon the current statutory regulations. 
The debt management through a separate agency model has its advantages and draw-
backs. Via such an agency, one of the most important aims of debt management can cer-
tainly be achieved – paring down costs, for the persons who work in such an agency are 
usually highly specialised and very well acquainted with the state of the market, and are 
thus the more capable of predicting any changes in this state that there might be. In setting 
up such an agency, the government sends a clear signal that it does not consider debt man-
agement part of the running of monetary policy, for which the central bank alone is respon-
sible, but a separate mater that has a great significance for government finances. 
By contrast, in countries in which the financial market is insufficiently developed, a 
special debt management agency can complicate rather than help in the better coordina-
tion of public debt management and monetary policy running.4 Accordingly in such coun-
tries special agencies tend not to be set up, rather public debt management is kept inside 
the finance ministry, in close collaboration with the central bank (Kalderen, 1997).
It should be said that, irrespective of the institutional solution chosen for debt manage-
ment, this does not totally exclude other institutions, for in many cases individual functions 
and activities are intertwined and supplement each other. For this reason good collabora-
tion among these institutions and coordination of their activities are very important.
2.1.2 Transparency of and responsibility for public debt management 
Division of responsibility among Finance Ministry and central bank and, if it exists, 
the special agency is very important with respect to the conduct of all the matters related 
to debt management. Transparency and clear rules for running central bank and finance 
ministry operations are off essential help in the resolution of conflicts between monetary 
policy and debt management policy and reduce investor insecurity, diminish their trans-
4 From this it can be concluded that the current public debt management approach in the Finance Ministry is 
for the moment completely fine.157
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action costs and, ultimately, help the government to reduce the costs of debt servicing 
(IMF and World Bank, 2003).
The objectives of debt management should be clear and accessible to the public, and 
all methods used to quantify risk and costs should be explained in detail. It is crucial that 
all information about budgetary activities, including how they are financed, should be 
constantly accessible to the public. And that is why it is best for all data about the domes-
tic debt programme to be published regularly. Developed countries devote great attention 
to making sure of transparency in debt management policy and so do countries that have 
only recently entered the EU, such as Hungary, which regularly publish programmes for 
the auctions of government securities.5
The government should regularly publish information about the currency and interest 
structure of the debt and financial assets and the structure of maturities. It is particularly 
important to inform the public about all conditional liabilities of the government, and the 
tax treatment of government bonds when the government issues them for the first time. 
All activities related to debt management should be subject to annual independent audit-
ing. In some countries there is actually an official body for the scrutiny of all government 
transactions, and it draws up regular reports about the legality of the way in which these 
transactions have been carried out.6
2.2 Monetary policy: the importance of the independence of the central bank
It is the basic objective of the monetary policy of most countries to preserve price sta-
bility, for this stability is the foundation for the achievement of economic growth, a high 
degree of employment and improvement in living standards.7
In many undeveloped countries the central banks are under strong governmental influ-
ence, one of their roles being to loan to the state at minimum rates of interest. Of course, such 
financing of the government is completely against market principles, which require that all, 
including the government, must meet their financial needs on the market, on equal terms. 
The Treaty of Maastricht in Article 107 forbids central banks to finance the government and 
guarantees the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the central nation-
al banks of all the member states. No central bank of any EU member country is allowed 
to seek or receive instructions from the government or any other institution of the EU, and 
all these institutions must refrain from exerting any influence on the policies of the ECB or 
the national central banks (Treaty on European Union, 1992, Maastricht). It is interesting 
to point out that in debates about the obligations and responsibilities of debt and monetary 
management institutions stress is always laid on the importance of central bank independ-
ence from the finance ministry or any institution charged with public debt management. 
Why this independence is so important can be demonstrated well from the example of Italy 
5 See: http://www.akk.hu.
6 In Croatia there is a special government body for control of the way budgetary resources are spent – the State 
Auditing Office, set up by the Croatian Parliament, while there is also the parliamentary committee for the assessment 
of conflicts of interest with respect to government officials.
7 This goal of running monetary policy is mentioned in Chapter 2, Article 105 of the Treaty of Maastricht.158
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in which during the 1970s because of the long-term expansionist monetary policy and the 
ability of the central bank to lend to the government the monetary aggregates rose greatly. 
For this reason in 1981 an important decision was make to keep the finance ministry and 
the central bank apart in institutional terms, after which the powerful growth of monetary 
aggregates was halted.8 This same or a similar scenario existed in many other countries, and 
it can be concluded that for the realisation of the basic aim of monetary policy – the preser-
vation of price stability, the independence of the central bank from the finance ministry or 
a separate institution for government debt management is of great importance. 
The most important spur to the separation of debt management policy and monetary 
policy derives from Maastricht, which prohibits a government to borrow money from the 
central bank. In spite of this there are still political pressures on central banks and their 
monetary policies, and even the ECB because of its interest rate policies and the strength 
of the euro is still the target of criticism from governments of EU member states.9
One of the most drastic examples of a threat to the independence of a central bank 
occurred in Germany in December 2004 when the finance minister, because of the enor-
mous budgetary deficit, urged the Bundesbank to sell its whole gold quota from the Eu-
ropean Central Banks Agreement and thus provide the government with about a billion 
euros. The Bundesbank did not succumb to the pressure, however, and the bank’s council 
adopted a unanimous resolution not to sell gold in 2004. Even in a developed and demo-
cratic country like Finland there are occasional pressures on the central bank. At the end 
of 2003, the finance minister proposed that the central bank should be bound by law to 
transfer the whole of the profit it makes (instead of the half as hitherto) to the state. But 
this proposal did not pass, because the Finnish central bank and the ECB deemed that 
such a measure would reduce the ability of the central bank to prevent financial crisis in 
the country and the environment (Brione, 2005).
Although it might from this be concluded that the requirement of central bank in-
dependence is far from being consistent with any connection with public debt manage-
ment or debt management policy coordination, this is in fact not the case. In spite of the 
requirement of independence, it is not the case that the central bank should have nothing 
to do with public debt management. On the contrary, among the functions of the central 
banks of developed countries are those that relate to a certain responsibility for debt man-
agement. Naturally this responsibility must not be in opposition to the basic objective of 
the central bank, the maintenance of price stability.
At a minimum this responsibility includes:
•   an advisory function; the central bank will inform the finance ministry about liquid-
ity of the banking system, the trends in interest rates, monetary and credit aggregates. 
This information is very important for decision making about the way of financing 
the deficit and for achieving the objectives of monetary policy;
•   function of issuing agent – in many countries the central bank manages the auctions 
of government bonds and organises and runs the clearance and payment system;
8 See: Santini (1997).
9 See: Brione (2005).159
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•   function of fiscal agent – the central bank carries out payments and collections on 
behalf of the government and thus works as a government treasurer.10 
Thus the central bank can perform certain functions related to public debt management 
for in this way it will better coordinate with public debt management policy and ensure 
the realisation of its objectives. It is most important that in so doing it does not in any way 
finance the government, and the government must not exert any pressures on the central 
bank with respect to the running of monetary policies (interest and exchange rates).
3   Possible solutions for the coordination of public debt management and running 
monetary policy
3.1 Basic preconditions for good coordination
The basic preconditions for good coordination are the development of the financial 
market, the independence of the central bank and the transparency of fiscal policy.
What coordination in a given country is like depends on the ability to meet these pre-
conditions. 
In most countries there are formal and informal solutions for coordinating and ex-
changing information among fiscal and monetary agencies, and explicit and implicit co-
ordination approaches. Explicit approaches are necessary in countries that do not have 
a well enough developed market for government securities. Implicit coordination exists 
in countries with developed financial markets and is conducted in order for debt man-
agement objectives to be harmonised with those of running monetary policy. Coordina-
tion is much harder in countries in which the financial market is undeveloped for then 
the sources of financing the government are limited, which also limits the independence 
of the central bank.
If all the circumstances are ideal, the process of harmonising the objectives and ac-
tions of these policies can be implemented without major problems. Then the financial 
market will function as a disciplined mechanism sending timely and accurate signals to 
the decision makers and making it easier for them to harmonise their policies. Since it is 
rather hard to achieve ideal conditions, it is needful to create appropriate arrangements for 
the coordination of pubic debt management and the running of monetary policy.
3.2 Specific features of coordination in transition countries 
In economies in transition, in which the financial markets are usually not well 
enough developed, the development of this market is the common objective of the mon-
etary and financial authorities, and monetary management and public debt management 
need not be totally separate. If, as in Croatia, these segments are separate, there must 
be good coordination of the objectives and instruments of monetary and of debt man-
agement policy. 
Why such coordination is important can be seen from the following table.
10 See: Blommestein and Thunholm (1997).160
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Table 1 Budgetary restriction and coordination of policies
Fiscal policy Debt management Monetary policy
Dt (Bt - Bt-1)( M t - Mt-1) (1)
Source: Sundararajan, Dattels and Blommestein (1997:7).
What is clear from the table is that it is necessary to have coordination among these 
policies for the main elements of fiscal policy (size of the budgetary deficit), debt man-
agement (issue of public debt) and monetary policy (rate of rise in money aggregates) 
are all interlinked. Expression (1) shows that the budgetary deficit in the current peri-
od (Dt) must be financed either by the net sale of bonds (Bt – Bt-1) to the public (banks, 
corporations or individuals) or by central bank loans, resulting in a rise in the money 
supply (Mt-Mt-1). It has to be said that this greatly simplifies reality for in most coun-
tries the money supply is not created only by the government borrowing money from 
the central bank, and in the case of Croatia is not created at all in this manner. Still, 
this model is the base for the understanding of the interdependence of these important 
policies. Until these policies can be completely divorced from each other, the need for 
them to be coordinated rises. There are three examples of coordination, with differing 
implications.
1. The monetary authorities are able to determine the money supply and thus the mag-
nitude of the monetary aggregate Mt t=1, 2, 3…, in line with their objective, control of in-
flation. The deficit then depends on monetary objectives and financial possibilities. Such 
a solution requires the central bank to have operational autonomy in the determination of 
the monetary base and in addition that there is a high enough degree of coordination and 
fiscal discipline for fiscal balance to be maintained.
2. The fiscal authorities determine the size of the deficit Dt, t=1,2,3…, and the mon-
etary authorities subsequently ensure the amount of monetary aggregate necessary to fi-
nance the budgetary deficit. The consequence is that the basic objective of the central 
bank, which is the maintenance of price stability, can be jeopardised, particularly when 
the fiscal deficit is high as compared with the stabilisation objectives and when the op-
portunities for debt issues outside the central bank are very restricted. This is typical of 
many countries in transition.
3. Fiscal and monetary authorities make decisions independently of each other con-
cerning the magnitude of the fiscal deficit and the monetary base. In well developed mar-
kets for government bonds, the deficit is financed in a non-inflationary manner – by the 
selling of bonds, Bt, t=1,2,3…, outside the central bank, to commercial banks, non-bank-
ing institutions and individuals. In such a situation the interest and exchange rates are set 
in line with current trends in this developed financial market.
The situation described in the third case would be desirable, but it often not very real-
istic in transition countries for, because their financial markets are undeveloped, it is im-
possible to determine the deficit and independently affect the money supply. Transition-
al countries that still have a situation like that described in the second example must for 
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the sake of coordinating fiscal and monetary policies concern themselves not only with 
the harmonisation of the objectives of these policies but also of the development of the 
financial market.
By way of conclusion to this part of the paper it can be said that in transition coun-
tries stabilisation and the development of the financial market are the common aim of 
monetary policy and debt management policy, and these two policies need not be strict-
ly separated, but if they are, there must be good coordination of all the activities through 
which the objective is to be reached.
3.2.1 Institutional and operational arrangements for better coordination 
The coordination of fiscal and monetary policy and debt management policy is im-
possible without concrete institutional and operational arrangements, the most important 
of which are11:
•   restricting the central bank in its lending to the government, reducing potential con-
flicts between central bank and finance ministry
•   founding a certain body to coordinate the scope of debt issues in the primary mar-
ket and the objectives of monetary policy
•   operational arrangements concerning exchange of information and forecasts of trends 
in the government balance sheet
•   joint action of central bank finance ministry in fostering development of the second-
ary market for government bonds.
Secondary markets that function well are for important for the finance ministry for 
they stimulate demand and are able to absorb quite large bond issues without major diffi-
culties. For this reason in many countries the central bank and finance ministry undertake 
joint activities to encourage the development of a secondary market.12
In the transitional phase, which is still occupied by Croatia, the central bank should 
go on developing open market operations, which requires everyday direct contacts with 
market participants and vigorous coordination of all the instruments for running mone-
tary policy. Also very important is exchange of information between central bank and fi-
nance ministry in order to be able to keep up with and forecast trends in the balance sheet 
of government revenue and expenditure.
In the developed phase, in which the financial market is already quite deep, the ob-
jectives of running the monetary policy and public debt management can be separate be-
cause good coordination is achieved by market operations and market signals, and the 
further development of market institutions and instruments increasingly reduces the pos-
sibility of clashes.
As for working on the primary market, there are three arrangements for debt manage-
ment and monetary management. 
11 Ibid.
12 The example of Slovenia, in which through collaboration between finance ministry and central bank an orga-
nised OTC treasury bills market was launched.162
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1. The primary market is also used for monetary management and public debt man-
agement, but with different instruments.13 The monetary instruments are central bank se-
curities (in the case of the CNB these are central bank bills), special central bank deposits 
(mandatory reserves), special issues of treasury bills or loan auctions, and for the man-
agement of the public debt, only government securities are used.
2. The primary market is used only for the issue of government securities, and the 
central bank works only on the secondary market, in operations with high-quality gov-
ernment securities on the open market. This kind of solution is employed in most of the 
developed countries.
3. The primary government securities market is used for both monetary and debt man-
agement. This model, because of the lack of development in the secondary market, is em-
ployed in most of the transition and developing countries.
The greatest need for coordination exists in the third arrangement, which is typical 
of the developing country, while the second arrangement requires a lower degree of co-
ordination between monetary policy and debt management policy. It is best for transition 
countries in which the government securities market is not developed enough to choose 
the first option, in which it is most important clearly to define the common and the indi-
vidual responsibilities of monetary policy and of public debt management policy. It would 
seem that the problem in Croatia is that it has chosen this model, but yet has not clearly 
defined the common and the individual responsibilities of debt management and mone-
tary management.
3.3 Developed countries 
Coordination of debt management policy and monetary policy is an omnipresent theme 
in developed countries, and the criteria in Maastricht ordering every EU member state to 
limit its budgetary deficit at 3% of GDP, its total public debt to 60% of GDP and to keep 
inflation at the lowest possible level (about 2%) are along these lines. These percentages 
are not chosen at random. If one starts from the assumption that member states of the EU 
on average have a nominal rate of growth of GDP of about 5%, which is the result of a 
3% real growth and an average inflation of 2%, the relation between the 3% and the 60% 
is much clearer. For the 3% is exactly 5% of the 60%, and looked at economically, for a 
state with a nominal growth of GDP of 5% and a budgetary shortfall of 3% of GDP over 
the long run the public debt will stabilise at the 60% level (Orban and Szapary, 2004). Al-
though these convergence criteria are not arbitrarily set, the choice of them is called into 
question in many EU countries, and for several reasons. The most important reasons are 
that these criteria are fairly restrictive for the actual members of the EU, and that coun-
tries are very different in their economic structures and starting conditions, and so what is 
optimal for one does not have to be so for another economy (Švaljek, 1997).
It is hard to meet these criteria without good collaboration and coordination between 
fiscal, monetary and debt management policies. The lack of coordination among these pol-
13 This model is formally still applied in Croatia, but the last auction of central bank bills was held as long ago 
as April 23, 2004, and Croatia is accordingly drawing close to the second model, employed by most of the develo-
ped countries. 163
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icies can lead to macroeconomic instability and insecurity for the private sector as well as 
to inflation greater than planned, which will result in all those responsible for the policies 
losing credibility. For illustration, if, for example, current government spending is not fi-
nanced from current taxation and non-tax revenue of the government but by high deficits 
and public debts, then aggregate demand can rise very sharply, and with it inflation. Hence 
it is desirable for the government, under the same conditions as all other sectors, to take out 
debt only on the market. Still, excessive government borrowing from the banks is often a 
key factor affecting general monetary expansion, and for this reason certain fiscal adjust-
ments to halt this expansion are necessary. If adjustments are not made, and certain meas-
ures to halt monetary expansion are taken, the private sector will pay the highest price, be-
ing squeezed out of the loan market. In this manner economic growth can be slowed down, 
and this is the ultimate consequence of poor coordination of these important policies. 
Most of the developed countries pay great attention to issues of the coordination of 
monetary policy and debt management policy. In the UK, for example, the central bank 
advises the treasury in matters of coordination and on behalf of the treasury carries out 
market operations with government bonds. In Ireland a working group at the highest level 
of the finance ministry, the central bank and the debt management agency meets regularly 
in order to harmonise monetary policy and debt management policy as well as possible. 
In Sweden the debt management office is legally obliged to meet and negotiate with the 
central bank about monetary policy. In Sweden there are two commissions for coordina-
tion, for domestic and foreign debt (Crona, 1997).
Thus, in spite of the financial market being highly developed in these countries, and 
coordination being largely achieved by the operation of market mechanisms, there is still 
need for the coordination of these important policies.
3.3.1 Foundation of working groups for coordination 
For the sake of coordinating debt management and running monetary policy, in many 
countries formal or informal working groups are set up. These groups have an important 
role in reducing or entirely obviating conflicts in the aims of central bank, finance minis-
try and debt management agency; they are composed of senior representatives of all these 
institutions. The remit of such coordinating bodies differs from country to country, but 
most of them have the following activities in common:
•   planning the sale of government bonds, including the establishment of quarter-
ly and annual objectives, for which it is necessary accurately to value government 
revenue and expenditure. It is also necessary to pay attention to the aims of mon-
etary policy
•   collaboration and consultation with financial institutions about their preferences to 
do with the characteristics of existing debt instruments
•   discussion of the use of debt instruments for monetary purposes and about the mod-
ernisation of the government securities market
•   debates about necessary changes in the primary market, including the procedures 
and frequency of auctions and the planning of the introduction of new instruments 
(Leite, 1992).164
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Apart from such mixed working groups, the central bank will often found its own in-
ternal group for monetary management, which is supposed to make sure of the harmoni-
sation of the differing factors that affect the trends in bank reserves and the money supply 
so that the stability of the monetary supply should not be distorted. Everyday implemen-
tation of market interventions is usually assigned to the monetary operations department 
of the central bank.14 As the market develops, so also develops the need for day-by-day 
exchange of information among the departments for the implementation of monetary op-
erations and institutions for public debt management.
3.4 Why conflicts arise and whether they can be avoided by better coordination? 
Conflicts arise between debt management policy and monetary policy because debt 
management is primarily aimed at finding a compromise between costs and risks, while 
monetary policy is usually aimed at preserving price stability. We list below the most fre-
quent areas of potential conflict between debt management and monetary policy.
Level of interest rates. In conditions of large rises of monetary aggregates and dan-
gers of inflation the central bank will often, for the sake of preventing inflation, take 
measures that tend to lead to a rise in the interest rate. This can be opposed to the inten-
tions of the fiscal authorities to borrow on the domestic market under conditions as fa-
vourable as possible.
Rising government borrowing on the financial market. Central banks often warn gov-
ernments that any borrowing, not matter what the purpose, can have monetary effects that 
must be taken into consideration. For example, the sale of large quantities of government 
securities can lead to too great a rise in government deposits, and hence to danger of too 
great a rise in government spending, and to inflation. And so it is important that the cen-
tral bank obtains prompt information about planned borrowing and intervenes in time so 
as to achieve its fundamental goal – the preservation of price stability.
The similarity of monetary policy instruments and debt management policy instru-
ments and their working in the same segment of the market. The issue of similar instru-
ments for different purposes (instruments of monetary policy are issued for the sake of 
managing the liquidity of the system, and public debt management instruments for the 
sake of acquiring the financial resources that the government needs) confuses players on 
the joint market creates an unnecessary rivalry between these instruments. If central bank 
securities and government securities are issued at the same time, there can be a conflict 
of monetary authorities and the institution for the management of the debt, in the sense 
of coordination of their maturities. For this reason it would be desirable to limit the ma-
turity of central bank securities to shorter periods (at best 1-3 months)15 and the maturity 
of government treasury bills should be longer (3 to 6 months). This kind of approach will 
considerably reduce the direct competition between the treasury bills and the central bank 
securities. For this reason the CNB too has stopped issuing central bank bills (or CNB 
bills) with a maturity date similar to that of the treasury bills of the Finance Ministry. Now 
14 There is a department of this kind in the CNB as well.
15 This is a period that is long enough for the achievement of the aims of monetary policy – liquidity management. 165
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the CNB may issue central bank bills with short maturity terms (35 days) and the Finance 
Ministry treasury bills with longer maturities (91, 182 and 364 days). 
It is very hard to avoid conflicts between these two policies completely, for some-
times there real objectives are opposed (particularly to do with the level of interest rates) 
but with better coordination of their activities and the determination of joint aims these 
conflicts could be made much less frequent.
3.5   Development of the government securities market as precondition for better 
coordination 
The development of the government securities market has a positive effect on the 
achievement of the objectives of monetary policy and the public debt management pol-
icy for it ensures greater transparency and predictability of the public debt management 
policy, which then makes it easier to conduct monetary policy. There are several ways in 
which the government securities market and the accomplishment of public debt manage-
ment and monetary policy are connected, as can be seen below.
•   As agents for the collection of financials resources for government purposes, per-
sons who manage the debt are interested in the proper functioning of the govern-
ment securities market and its efficiency, all with the objective of minimising the 
debt servicing costs.
•   As institution competent for the implementation of monetary policy, the central bank 
endeavours to promote effective establishment of interest rates as important element 
of the transmission mechanism for monetary policy. Since the central bank will of-
ten intervene via the government securities market, the proper functioning of this 
market is important for the accomplishment of the aims of monetary policy. 
•   Monetary, fiscal and other regulatory authorities have a joint interest in the develop-
ment of an effective government securities market, for the sake of achieving macr-
oeconomic stability (Dattels, 1995). 
The development of an effective government securities market is in the interests of 
both the public and the private sector and we can consider it a public good that is useful to 
all who pay taxes because it ensures lower debt servicing costs, and it is useful to the whole 
financial sector, for it promotes safe and effective forms of saving and investment. 
It is very important, for good functioning of the market, to choose a market structure 
that best corresponds to the needs and capacities of the individual country. Market struc-
tures are increasingly tending to change and from auction-agency markets are in practice 
increasingly operating as dealer markets. In many countries this trend is encouraged by 
the government, in whose interest it is that there should be specialised primary dealers 
of government securities, who make it easier to carry out monetary operations and debt 
management operations.16
Since new kinds of government securities are constantly appearing (derivatives, op-
tions) and since the technology is increasingly progressive, the market structure has to 
16 Ireland has a particularly well organised system of primary dealers for government securities.166
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adjust, and the majority of developed markets have electronic trading systems. In some 
countries, differing market structures serve different market segments, and, for example, 
appropriate systems are introduced to encourage small investor investment in govern-
ment securities.17
Countries in which government securities are largely held and traded by the house-
hold sector should have an auction-agency market, which is transparent and enables low 
transactional costs, while in countries in which government securities are mostly held by 
specialised institutions with large portfolios, who want transactions to be carried out at 
once, the best solution is a dealer market (Dattels, 1995).
In eurozone countries securities are often sold via a syndicate of financial institutions, 
which is a good alternative to auctions for countries with insufficiently developed finan-
cial markets as well. In countries in which there is no liquid secondary market the gov-
ernment will find it hard to set a price that will be acceptable for a new issue of securities, 
and then the syndicates are very effective in minimising the risks of selling government 
securities.18 Today, however, there are more and more countries that make use of a net-
work of primary dealers for the distribution of government securities. Thus during 2007 
the Finance Ministry is planning to introduce a system of primary dealers, for it thinks it 
will thereby achieve greater market liquidity, which helps in the establishment of refer-
ence yield curves, ultimately resulting in an optimisation of the costs of government bor-
rowing (Ministarstvo financija, 2007). This Finance Ministry intention can be considered 
a step forward in coordination with monetary policy, for better market liquidity and fewer 
interest rate oscillations are in the interest of the CNB. In Slovenia through collaboration 
between central bank and finance ministry, in 2002 a system of primary dealers for treas-
ury bills was introduced, and in as little as six months, the costs of government borrow-
ing fallen by two percentage points. Not only have interest rates fallen, but the yield curve 
has become less steep, in fact almost horizontal, which means that the maturity premium 
has also reduced (Dolenc, 2003). The introduction of primary dealers brings a number of 
advantages, but certain risks as well. There is no doubt that through this system of sale of 
government securities, a broad investor base is secured, and the liquidity of the market is 
improved. But if such a system is chosen, there must be objective criteria for the selec-
tion of primary dealers, and their rights and obligations must be clearly determined so as 
to prevent any possible abuse (Glaessner and Ladekarl, 2001).
4 Coordination in Croatia to date: planned activity or an uncontrolled process?
Coordination of goals, instruments and institutional solutions in the management of 
the public debt and in monetary management is particularly important in transition coun-
tries like Croatia. In countries where there is a strict institutional division of goals and 
responsibilities for the management of the debt and for monetary management and that 
have a well developed financial market, this coordination is accomplished by the work-
17 In Spain, for example, the Madrid stock exchange has introduced a computer system that enables rapid access 
and transparent trading to small investors, and in Italy the Rome stock exchange has introduced an electronic auction 
market for the “patient” retail trading of government securities.
18 This technique for selling government securities is applied in Croatia as well.167
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ing of market mechanisms and the importance of formal coordination is much less. Since 
the market in Croatia is still not well enough organised or arranged, it is necessary to have 
better coordination of debt management and monetary policy running, particularly at the 
operations level.
It would seem that in Croatia, ever since the establishment of independence, not 
enough attention has been paid to coordination of public debt management and the run-
ning of monetary policy. In the last fifteen years, these two important policies have been 
run independently, although the instruments used (central bank and treasury bills) have 
been very similar and operated in the same segment of an insufficiently well developed 
financial market. This kind of separation between debt management and monetary poli-
cies is totally acceptable and even desirable on condition that good coordination between 
the two policies is effectuated. Coordination of the objectives, instruments, institutional 
and operational arrangements between public debt management and running the mone-
tary policy are important not only for avoiding potential conflicts of jurisdiction but also 
because by joint action, exchange of information and technical collaboration it is possi-
ble to speed up the process of market building, expand the room for manoeuvre of fiscal 
and monetary policy, encourage saving and as a result of all of this support the macroeco-
nomic stability of the country (Babić et al., 2001).
Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that in the last few years a major move in the direc-
tion of coordination has been achieved, both formally and practically. Formally this was 
most produced by the existing CNB Law, which prohibits direct government borrowing 
from the CNB. Nevertheless at the same time, the ability to carry out open market opera-
tions was opened up, and this in an indirect way expanded the ability of the government 
to borrow on the local market. It can also be concluded that a step forward from the point 
of view of coordination was embodied in the decision of the CNB to abolish the regu-
lar issue of central bank bills with the same maturity as that of the treasury bills of the 
Finance Ministry19. It can also be said that this measure was probably motivated by the 
joint wish of the CNB and the Finance Ministry to that these securities should not com-
pete with each other, that the demand for treasury bills should be increased, and that pub-
lic debt management should be oriented more to the domestic market. 
In the relations between the Finance Ministry and the CNB today, the greatest prob-
lem is lack of adequate communication as well as the distrust that occasionally appears 
between the two institutions. Although in joint communiqués during formal meetings the 
good collaboration is stressed, in practice things are often quite different. In May 2005 
the Finance Ministry reacted extremely intemperately to the decision of the CNB Coun-
cil to increasing the marginal foreign currency reserves for foreign debts from 30 to 40%. 
The CNB often drew attention to the rise in foreign debt (Rohatinski, 2004; 2005), which 
could well endanger the country’s financial stability, and since these warnings were not 
heeded, the CNB took appropriate measures. Still, the Finance Ministry uttered opinions 
that before the introduction of this measure the CNB should have consulted the ministry 
and that it had been late in passing this measure that at the moment when the government 
19 The last regular auction was held on April 23, 2004, and within the fine adjustments operations it was possi-
ble to issue central bank bills with very short maturities (35 days).168
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was more and more addressing the domestic market might have affected the rise of inter-
est rates and a renewed resort to foreign borrowing (Finance Ministry 2005). By contrast, 
the CNB viewpoint is that the stated restrictive measures of monetary policy were taken 
to meet the basic elements of the policy defined in the existing stand-by arrangement with 
the IMF. One of these elements was the issue of the foreign debt that had in the last few 
years grown rapidly and that from 13.5 billion euros at the end of 2001 had increased to 
about 29 billion at the end of 2006, rising as a proportion of GDP from 61 to 85%. It is in 
the interest of the whole of the domestic economy that the Government and in particular 
the Finance Ministry should be more actively involved in addressing the problem of high 
foreign indebtedness. In the CNB it is thought that all the measures taken have the exclu-
sive objective of preserving monetary stability, which is in everyone’s interest, and that 
the CNB, whenever monetary conditions permitted, did everything to enable the govern-
ment to borrow money on the domestic market (Rohatinski, 2005).
In spite of the existence of the collaboration committee between the Finance Minis-
try and the CNB, and the Croatian National Bank Law that binds the Finance Ministry 
to make regular reports to the bank concerning all transactions of the central government 
budget and all operations related to the public debt20, collaboration has never been good 
enough and definitely needs improving. For example when the monetary projections of 
the CNB are being constructed, it is very important to have timely delivery of the rele-
vant data on all current and planned transactions of the budget. And yet it has happened 
that the CNB has not received such information on time, which cast doubt on the reliabil-
ity of its monetary projections.
In recent times positive signals have been observed in the coordination between the 
CNB and the Finance Ministry, particularly to do with certain arrangements connected 
with the money market. Because of the increasingly significant money surpluses that ap-
pear from time to time in the accounts of the state, the Finance Ministry plans to locate 
these surpluses on the money market, and thus consults with the CNB. The government 
receives an interest of 0.68% for money that it keeps with the CNB, and by lending the 
money surpluses on the money market it can obtain a much better rate. The CNB has noth-
ing against this, for it thinks that lending the surpluses on the money market rather than 
spending them can have the result of additionally reducing the interest rates and in addi-
tion is an indication of more rational behaviour on the part of the government and better 
cash management.21 It should be said here that these improvements are definitely con-
nected with the introduction of the centralised system of the government treasury, which 
is being increasingly computer enhanced and in future should make sure of a still more 
rational management of the cash of the government treasury, which should also have a 
positive effect on public debt management Before the introduction of the treasury system, 
there were thousands of accounts in which budgetary resources were held, and it was pos-
sible that the state was having to borrow on the market even when it had resources avail-
20 Article 34, Croatian National Bank Law (OG 36/01)
21 The level of government deposits in the CNB is constantly on the decline and thus in December 2005 they 
came to 604 million kuna, while in December 2006 they were only 293 million kuna, which can indicate better liq-
uidity management. 169
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able, which because of bad liquidity management it did not make use of. With better li-
quidity management the need for government borrowing has been reduced, and above all 
for short-term loans to maintain current liquidity, which are very expensive and in addi-
tion increased the costs of managing the public debt. Better management of government 
cash also reduces the potential danger of monetary expansion and the need for CNB in-
terventions, the liquidity of the corporate sector is improved and the chances of it being 
squeezed out of the financial market are reduced.
The issue of harmonising public debt management policy and the running of mon-
etary policy has a powerful reflection on the state of liquidity in the banking system and 
affects the development of the primary and secondary market for bonds. The total value 
and time of the issue of government securities will not always coincide with the needs 
of the CNB’s monetary policy, and it can happen that the government will issue certain 
securities even when there is a market shortage of liquidity. The CNB then has to adopt 
some measure to ensure additional banking system liquidity. For this reason it is high-
ly important that the bodies responsible for debt management and for fiscal and mone-
tary policy should regularly exchange information about current and future government 
financial resources requirements. Such harmonisation of the running of monetary policy 
and the policy of public debt management is at the moment quite limited, and exchange 
of information is mostly implemented between the governor and the minister, while ex-
change of data among the individual departments of the Finance Ministry and the CNB 
is at a very low level (Svjetska banka and Ministarstvo financija, 2005). It should also be 
said that current coordination is better in the sphere of the money market, which is very 
largely thanks to the introduction of open market operations. Interest rates on the money 
market are constantly going down, and this is reflected in the capital market. Still, there 
is work to do on better coordination of the Finance Ministry and the CNB during the is-
sue of kuna denominated bonds, every issue of which has a powerful effect on the liquid-
ity of the financial system, and timely information about all issues related to the issue of 
them is exceptionally important for financial system stability.
Instead of a conclusion to this part of the paper it can be said that in spite of certain 
improvements in the last few years, coordination to date between public debt management 
and monetary policy has been more of an ad hoc and unsystematic nature than a planned 
activity. Of course, because of the difference in the basic objectives and functions of the 
two institutions, sometimes it is impossible to avoid conflicts, but they would certainly 
be rarer if there were better collaboration between them.
4.1   The independence of the CNB and obstacles to coordination with
the Finance Ministry 
The CNB has achieved a very high level of autonomy, and occasional attempts at 
pressure need not be taken seriously since this happens in many other, much more de-
veloped, countries. The CNB has a statutory foundation for its independent conduct of 
monetary policy. Of course, independence ought not to imply isolation and self-suffi-
ciency in the CNB, for it can accomplish its aims only in collaboration with other insti-
tutions. Hence it is important once again to stress that better coordination with the CNB 
and the Finance Ministry has to be achieved, and a first step in this direction should be 170
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the achievement of an at least approximate consensus on the optimal combination of fis-
cal and monetary policies.
It has turned out many times that only independent institutions can be good collab-
orators, without having to jeopardise their basic functions. Thus in the Croatian Nation-
al Bank Law there are clear provisions about borrowing at home and abroad, but noth-
ing about the financing of this borrowing, and the occasional pressures along these lines 
are without basis. Collaboration and coordination of monetary and fiscal policy, and so 
public debt management policy, are very important for the conduct of a consistent eco-
nomic policy.
The existing obstacles in the way of better coordination are as follows:
•   The occasional lack of promptness in delivering data to the CNB about revenue and 
expenditure of the government and about planned borrowing; these are exception-
ally important for forecasting the liquidity of the financial system. For precise fore-
casts, two elements are crucial: the trends in cash outside the banks and the trends 
of government kuna denominated deposits.
•   Although communication between the CNB and the Finance Ministry does exist, it 
is still not good enough, and there are occasional mutual recriminations via the me-
dia, which are sometimes unworthy of such institutions.
•   The financial market is still not developed well enough, particularly the govern-
ment securities market. It should be said however that thanks to the introduction 
of open market operations the market for government securities has become much 
more vigorous in the last few years. To encourage further development of this mar-
ket the CNB and the Finance Ministry could jointly initiate the introduction of gov-
ernment securities primary dealers, which in Slovenia has proved to be outstand-
ingly good.
•   Fiscal policy is still insufficiently transparent, although improvement is to be ex-
pected in the coming years. At the beginning of 2007, for the first time, the Finance 
Ministry published a Public Debt Management Strategy for the coming three years, 
and a calendar for the issue of government securities for 200722. Still, the Strategy 
does not have detailed elaborations of risk management models, which are very im-
portant for keeping debt management costs down. Ireland could serve as a model for 
us; its strategy includes high quality risk management, and the Irish debt manage-
ment agency monitors the trends in interest rates on the financial market and bor-
rows only when it assesses the interest rate as being favourable, and will often refi-
nance debt issued at a higher rate of interest with a debt at a lower rate.23
The CNB has often warned that it is not well enough informed about government 
policy, although the CNB Law lays down the government’s obligation to supply the cen-
tral bank with all proposals and reports that relate to the objectives, operations and tasks 
of the CNB, including drafts of laws, before they are sent to Parliament. The CNB should 
also, according to this law, give its opinion on all these proposals.
22 (http://www.mfin.hr/str/143/).
23 Thanks to this kind of management, debt servicing costs in 2004 were about 350 million euros lower than the 
resources earmarked for the purpose (http://www.ntma.ie/Publications/2005/Annual_Report_2005.pdf).)171
Z. Raspudić Golomejić: Coordination of Public Debt Management and Running Monetary Policy in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 31 (2) 153-183 (2007)
If there were better communication about fiscal and monetary policy and better quality 
and more frequent communication with the public from the CNB and the Finance Minis-
try, as well as better presentation of their objectives and tasks, then probably there would 
be fewer misinterpretations of some of the activities of these important institutions.
4.2 Measures of monetary policy for better debt management
In the last few years the CNB has taken a number of measures to facilitate public debt 
management without having its basic objective, preservation of price stability, jeopard-
ised. Thus through a decision of the CNB Council in October 2004 the rate of the manda-
tory reserve was reduced from 19 to 18%, which made it easier to accomplish the issue of 
government bonds with which the Finance Ministry is endeavouring to replace some of 
the excessive foreign debt with domestic borrowing. With kuna collected from the CNB, 
the government bought the foreign currency necessary for the repayment of the Samu-
rai- bonds that had fallen due in mid-December 2004, and with this purchase it also neu-
tralised the effect of the issue of bonds on domestic monetary trends. In January 2006, 
the mandatory reserve rate was again reduced, from 19 to 17%, which made sure of suf-
ficient quantities of liquid resources for the accomplishment of the issue of kuna denom-
inated bonds of the Finance Ministry in December 2005 and February 2006. Such meas-
ures are fully in harmony with the practice of developed countries, and are also in line 
with the long-term policy of the CNB, which is aimed at the gradual reduction of the rate 
of the mandatory reserve.
In its measures the CNB always endeavours to support the government in its attempts 
to finance budget deficits without resort to new foreign debts (HNB, 2006). For the sake 
of greater government financing on the domestic market instead of additional borrowing 
abroad, a decision of the CNB in February 2005 resulted in a reduction of the minimum 
rate of coverage of foreign liabilities of banks with foreign currency claims from 35 to 
32%. This set free about 4 billion kuna, which provided the banking system sufficient liq-
uid resources for the purchase of the government bonds issued in April to the value of 3 
billion kuna, without squeezing the other sectors out of the financial market. If the gov-
ernment had not then met its current requirements on the domestic market, it would have 
covered them with an issue of 500 million Eurobonds on the foreign market, thus exac-
erbating an already too large foreign debt (HNB, 2006).
For the sake of institutional and operational independence, the central bank may not 
adopt measures directly aimed at the reduction of the costs of debt management, and 
yet this independence does not prevent it from achieving better coordination with the 
Finance Ministry or from taking measures to make it easier, indirectly, to manage the 
debt. In line with this, in April 2005, the CNB launched operations on the open market 
that, although taken above all for the advancement of monetary policy, can make it much 
easier to manage the public debt. The introduction of this instrument facilitates Finance 
Ministry borrowing on the domestic financial market and tends to increase demands of 
the banks for treasury bills of the Finance Ministry (HNB, 2006). Apart from that, new 
changes in the regulations about minimum bank liquidity have released additional liq-
uid resources for the short-term refinancing of government Eurobonds that fell due for 
redemption in 2006.172
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In the transitional phase that is still that of Croatia, the CNB should further develop 
its open market operations, which requires everyday direct contact with participants in the 
market and vigorous coordination of all monetary policy instruments. At the same time 
one should take care of the forecasting of trends in short term liquidity in the financial 
system, which is very essential for the running of open market operations. For precision 
of forecasting, it is important to exchange information between central bank and finance 
ministry, in order to be able to track and forecast trends in the balance sheet of govern-
ment revenue and expenditure.
At the end of this part of the paper it can be said that the CNB with all its measures 
to date, measures undertaken to make the management of the public debt easier and to 
substitute domestic for the mounting foreign debt, has achieved halfway results, which, 
without the support of other entities charged with economic policy, was to be expected. 
It would be most important for those responsible for fiscal policy, with the support of the 
CNB, to take over as soon as possible a more active role in the settlement of external dis-
equilibrium problems and the concomitant vulnerability (CNB, 2006).
4.3   Introduction of open market operations – an important step on the way to better 
coordination 
Some analysts characterised the very announcement of the CNB that it would intro-
duce open market operations as a desire to take over the function of debt management. But 
on the contrary, the fundamental function of open market operations is to smooth down 
the great fluctuations of interest rates on the money market. The overnight rates in the last 
few years oscillated in a range from 1 to 11%, which directly makes it impossible to form 
reference interest rates for short-term and long-term sources of funds, without which there 
can be neither development nor deepening of the financial markets (Rohatinski, 2004). 
The following figure shows these great oscillations during just one year, 2004.
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Since stabilisation of the interest rates is an essential precondition for quality public 
debt management too, the Finance Ministry is also very interested in introducing OMO 
and should collaborate with the CNB and exchange all information to make them easi-
er to carry out.
Table 2 shows the basic kinds of OMO, and all the other important elements essen-
tial for those taking part in the operations.
Table 2 Open market operations
Kind of 
operation










































The most important OMO are actually the repo operations that are carried out once a 
week via auctions, in which as only the treasury bills of the Finance Ministry without any 
foreign currency clause will at first serve as the collateral. Later these operations can be ex-
panded to kuna denominated securities of longer maturities, such as government bonds.
On the day of the auction the banks have to telephone in their bid or supply it via the 
Reuters dealing system by at the latest the time announced in the auction announcement. 
The minimum bid is of a million kuna. The CNB will accept bids arriving up to the time 
when the anticipated amount of liquidity it wishes to withdraw from the banking system 
has been reached, or alternatively the amount it wishes to release into the banking system. 
Up to the time of the establishment of a settlement system on the principle of delivery of 
securities on payment, the transfer of the money is carried out via the CLVPS (Croatian 
Large Value Payments System) and the transfer of securities via the Central Depositary 
Agency on the principle of delivery of securities without payment. In July 2005 the ap-
plication of the settlement system of delivery of securities concomitantly with payment 
began, and this is very important for the development of OMO, and in general for the ex-
pansion and development of the secondary market and the appearance of a larger number 
of different market participants.174
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Since OMO were introduced in April 2005, when there was a very high level of li-
quidity in the money market, the first eight regular repo auctions went by without any 
transactions at all, and it was only at the ninth auction that the value of the bids arriving 
was a symbolic 10 million kuna. It was expected that the number of bids would be great-
er in the periods when the level of liquidity in the money market fell. This really did hap-
pen, and auction after auction the total amount of bids moved in line with the situation 
respecting the liquidity of the banking system.
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It can be seen from the figure that the values of bids coming in oscillate, and the 
amounts of bids were the greatest during the summer and in December, when the require-
ments for cash are the highest. Nevertheless, in 2006 the values of bids were not high even 
during the summer months, which shows high liquidity in the financial system. In spite of 
the government during 2006 considerably enlarging its borrowings from domestic banks24, 
this was not reflected in the regular reverse repo auctions, probably because they were large-
ly short term debts that were at once used for the payment of outstanding liabilities fall-
ing due. Of course, it would not be good for the government constantly to increase its bor-
rowing on the domestic market (although because of the great rise in the external debt the 
government is increasingly oriented to domestic market borrowing) for this can lead to a 
shortfall in liquidity and an increased participation of banks in the repo auctions, and hence 
to monetary expansion and inflation. In this case the CNB would have to react with restric-
tive measures of monetary policy, and the highest price would then have to be paid by the 
private sector, which might find itself being squeezed out of the financial market. 
24 In March 2006 the level of internal government borrowing from the banks rose by about 2.6 billion kuna 
over the March figures.175
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Luckily, no such scenario was played out during 2006, and it is to be hoped that with 
sensible government spending and still better collaboration between the Finance Minis-
try and the CNB it will not happen.
Perhaps it is too early to make any hard and fast conclusions, but it would seem that 
OMO have produced good results already. Since their introduction in April 2005, the in-
terest rates on the money market have shown smaller oscillations, as visible in Fig. 3. Dur-
ing summer 2005 these oscillations were still great, but by October they had fallen essen-
tially, and since November 2005 the rate has not exceeded 4.15%.



































The stabilisation of the interest rates achieved with longer implementation of OMO 
positively affects the debt management policy. With the stabilisation of the overnight in-
terest rate, the interest rates on treasury bills and bonds have also been stabilised, as well 
as reduced, as can be seen in the following figure.
Figure 4 shows that up to mid-2005, until the introduction of OMO, then, interest rates 
on treasury bills oscillated very considerably. It can also be seen that at the beginning of 
2003 the government borrowed on the money market selling treasury bills at an interest 
rate of about 2.55% and yet by the end of 2003 this rate had risen to a high 7%, which 
necessarily was reflected on the growth of management costs for the total public debt. Af-
ter the CNB started OMO in April 2005, the demand for government securities rose, and 
the interest rates on government securities oscillated far less, and gradually stabilised at 
around 3.85%, which resulted in a reduction of the costs of debt servicing.25
25 On June 14 2005 the interest rate on treasury bills with a maturity of 365 days was 5.25%, and on Septem-
ber 5 2006 only 3.85%. 176
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Figure 4   Yields on treasury bills and kuna denominated bonds in Croatia
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a For treasury bills – average monthly rate; for bonds – according to price of the last day of tra-
ding in the month.
Source: HNB
Open market operations open up the possibility for the government to borrow more 
on the domestic market, with ever more favourable conditions, while the CNB will 
have to keep an eye on the growth of monetary aggregates not leading to destabilisa-
tion of the exchange rate, growth in inflation and the squeezing of other sectors out of 
the borrowers’ market. For this reason it is completely clear that the indirect monetari-
sation of part of the fiscal deficit via OMO does not reduce the onus on the state to re-
duce its deficit considerably, for only such a reduction can open up a space for OMO. If 
the government had in the recent few years made greater efforts to reduce the budget-
ary deficit, then the CNB would probably have made a decision to introduce OMO ear-
lier (Rohatinski, 2004).
The development of OMO will lead to a gradual accumulation of a certain amount of 
government bonds in the CNB portfolio, and it will manage them actively, all of which 
will have a positive effect on the development of the government securities market. Open 
market operations are effective in improving the functioning of the money and capital 
markets, and will lead to an improvement in the short-term liquidity of the banks, for they 
will be able to refinance their short-term liabilities at the CNB.
The public gained the impression, after the announcement of the CNB’s intention 
to carry out OMO that it was a concession to the Government that was no longer di-
rectly able to borrow at the central bank. Such ideas are legitimate and it is true that the 
measure will help the Government to switch its borrowing for the financing of its needs 
more to the domestic market, but it is also true that it will help in the development of 
the domestic financial market and the stabilisation of the foreign debt, which during the 177
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last few years has grown so enormously as to become the basic macroeconomic prob-
lem in Croatia.
All this leads to the conclusion that the introduction of open market operations is a 
measure that is useful for the whole of the economy and that we have in this way come a 
step closer to the EU, in which most of the member states have for many years used such 
operations. It is most important here not to forget that OMO are an instrument of mone-
tary policy only, and not a debt management policy, and hence the management of gov-
ernment securities in the CNB portfolio will be motivated exclusively by monetary con-
siderations. Through the introduction of OMO the CNB is not taking a more significant 
role in debt management, and the Finance Ministry will still have the main role in and full 
responsibility for this. In introducing open market operations the Croatian National Bank 
has only laid the foundations for future better coordination, and any other involvement of 
the CNB in debt management would be nothing but a conflict of interests.
5   The importance of further development of the government securities market for 
the advancement of coordination 
Experience shows that coordination between central bank and finance ministry is 
much better in countries that have already taken essential steps to financial reform and 
that have a well developed government securities market. A great problem in transition 
countries is the prevailing application of non-market although effective monetary instru-
ments such as the mandatory reserve, which slows down the development of an efficient 
and deeper market for government securities. Still it seems that in recent years a major 
step forward in the development of a market for government securities has been taken, 
which has been aided by the CNB reducing the rate of the mandatory reserve; in 2000 
this was still 30.5% but is today 17%. Of course, the CNB also paid attention to the pres-
ervation of the monetary stability of the land when it made its decisions concerning re-
duction of the mandatory reserve.
Croatia has a developed legislative framework for the development of a modern and 
deep financial market, but this is not enough, and a lot of effort has to be put into the de-
velopment of new financial instruments, and the government also needs to make a con-
tribution to this. We still have a poor financial structure with a dominant role played by 
the banks and an insufficiently developed secondary market to ensure greater liquidity of 
financial instruments.
The development of the domestic market of government securities is frustrated by ex-
cessive reliance on Eurobonds and the prevailing share of euro-linked bonds in the domes-
tic market. Still, since 2000, major advances have been made. The market for kuna debt 
instruments has been made deeper and liquidity on the secondary market is increased, pri-
marily thanks to the development of institutional investors, the most important of which 
are the pension funds. A great shortcoming until quite recently was the insufficient trans-
parency of the government securities primary market, and this will be improved by the 
publication of the calendar of security issues by the Finance Ministry.26 
26 See: http://www.mfin.hr/str/143.178
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In spite of the existence of a well-organised Zagreb Money Market27, it accounts for 
only about 30% of total transactions, and the remaining 70% are done through the inter-
bank money market. To protect market share, the ZMM started to develop a new system 
of trading that should enable its transformation into a hybrid bourse for trading in money 
and government securities. For the moment our money market is in fact just an overnight 
market in which trading goes on in money that is surplus to the mandatory reserve, and 
not a place for trading in short-term securities.
The most important stimulus to the development of the domestic market in govern-
ment securities was injected by pension reform and the foundation of a number of pen-
sion funds that all, according to the Pension Funds Law, have to have a large part of their 
assets invested in government securities.28 Perhaps it is not the happiest of approaches to 
oblige the funds to make certain investments if they are not in harmony with the market 
principles of operation, but this is sometimes necessary in countries that are only just de-
veloping a financial market and in which there is still a great aptness for moral hazard, 
and in most financial institutions risk management has hardly become viable.
The introduction of OMO is a new stimulus to the development of the government 
securities market. How vigorous the development of the government securities market is 
can be seen from the great interest elicited by the four issues of government kuna-nomi-
nated bonds. The demand for these kuna bonds was thrice the value of the issue, and the 
government soon found purchasers for a much bigger issue. The most important reason 
for such a great interest was the very high rate of interest, and those who had a surplus of 
cash did very good business. Such positive signals that come from the government secu-
rities market can considerably help the Finance Ministry in the creation of its debt man-
agement policy in the future. Obviously in making decisions about borrowing the govern-
ment will have to rely increasingly on the domestic market, and with ever more favour-
able rates of interest on the domestic public debt.
A big problem of the Croatian financial market is that the retail sector, which has a 
big potential for such investments, is not given the opportunity to invest in various gov-
ernment securities.29 The retail sector is still completely neglected, and yet it could in-
vest considerable resources in various kinds of government securities, but only if a good 
infrastructure is developed for the sake of a simple access to the market with a safe sys-
tem of trusteeship. Hungarian experience might provide us with a model. One of the 
important objectives of the Hungarian debt management agency is to maintain sever-
al channels of distribution for direct sale to the retail sector. Thanks to this, the share of 
the small investor in the purchase of government securities is about 10% of the domes-
tic debt, far from negligible. However, for the man in the street to make still greater in-
27 The ZMM started working in 1990 pursuant to the Money Market and Capital Market Law (OG 51/93). 
Supervised by the CNB, it operates as an independent joint stock company owned by its 24 shareholders (22 banks 
and 2 insurance companies).
28 The fund must put at least 50% of its assets into long-term debt securities issued by the Republic of Croa-
tia and the CNB.
29 According to CNB data, at the end of 2005 the retail sector had about 15.6 billion kuna of savings and time 
deposits in kuna (which are growing all the time) and 73 billion kuna worth of savings and time deposits in foreign 
currency, a large amount of which could be invested in government bonds.179
Z. Raspudić Golomejić: Coordination of Public Debt Management and Running Monetary Policy in Croatia
Financial Theory and Practice 31 (2) 153-183 (2007)
vestment in government securities, they are on sale the whole time via 2,800 Hungar-
ian post offices.30
In all countries with a developed market of government securities the internal debt 
is greater than the foreign, while in Croatia, at the end of 2004 already, the foreign debt 
was 54% of the public debt, and the internal debt 46%. Yet the situation changed during 
2005, which was very largely due to the increased sale of government bonds on the local 
market during the previous two years. Some experts think that foreign credit rating agen-
cies give better ratings to countries that have a greater degree of domestic debt in the to-
tal public debt (Svaljek, 1998). As against this, some think that the rating and solvency of 
a country are unaffected by whether the borrowing is in the domestic or the foreign mar-
ket. In spite of this, it would seem that in a situation of such a high foreign debt, it is nev-
ertheless better to replace part of the foreign debt by domestic, for this will encourage the 
development of the domestic financial market. Still, greater government borrowing on 
the domestic market brings with it greater debt management costs. So it would be best of 
all to reduce government borrowing to the lowest possible level, and if a larger amount 
is unavoidable, it is better to be oriented to the domestic than the foreign market, for it 
shows a greater interest in government securities, and there is then a reasonable expecta-
tion that interest rates will fall.
When interest rates on government securities sold on the domestic market drop, the 
main reason for greater borrowing abroad, which is at the moment the low interest in-
volved, will vanish. For example, the Samurai Bonds are sold in five series, at an interest 
rate of from 1.23 to 4%, while the interest rates for securities sold on the domestic market 
has in the last few years between 4.25 and 6.87%. Of course, with such conditions it would 
be frivolous to rely totally on the domestic market, because this would greatly increase the 
costs of servicing the debt. But by the same token the share of foreign in total public debt 
should not be too great, because this has an adverse effect on the foreign indebtedness of 
the country and increases the foreign currency risk in repaying the debt.
Just how vigorous the development of the market for government securities has been is 
shown by the fact that the Zagreb Bourse at the end of 2002 introduced a special bond in-
dex, CROBIS, which is often revised to include as many government bonds as possible.
Figure 5 shows that prices achieved in trading in government bonds oscillated a fair 
amount, but also it is possible to see a considerable rise in the index since mid-2004, which 
indicates increasing interest in government bonds. In the first half of 2005 regular trade in 
all securities quoted on the Zagreb Bourse reached more than 85% of all the deals in 2004, 
showing that the domestic financial market is increasingly vigorous (www.zse.hr).
An additional positive impetus to the development of the domestic market for gov-
ernment securities was given by the decision of the Zagreb Bourse on July 22, 2005, to 
abolish bourse commission to the end of the year, for as early as July, the revenue planned 
for 2005 had already been earned. The abolition of commission brought big savings to all 
members of the bourse, and reduced the transaction costs of all investors. This could give 
an additional stimulus to increased trading and the financial attractiveness of the Croatian 
capital market and better regional positioning before entry into the EU.
30 www.akk.hu180
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Thus it can be said that there is without doubt great potential for the further devel-
opment of the government securities market. According to a World Bank study (Anusic 
and Madarevic-Sujster, 2003) the assets of the pension funds alone should be 2015 have 
achieved a value of 15% of GDP and by 2030 almost 22% of GDP. The other non-bank-
ing financial institutions, particularly the insurance companies and the investment funds, 
are growing much more strongly and also creating a strong base of investors in govern-
ment securities. If we add to this non-institutional investors, it is clear that a base does ex-
ist, and the government, i.e. the Finance Ministry, must create new instruments that with 
the differing characteristics will appeal to all these investors.
6 Conclusion
The basic conclusion of the paper is that good coordination of debt management and 
monetary policy running is very important for the overall macroeconomic stability of the 
country. In Croatia total separation of these important policies occurred before the precon-
ditions for such a separation had been created. Splitting off public debt management from 
running monetary policy is a desirable process, but in parallel with this splitting better co-
ordination between the two important policies should have been created, and some other 
important preconditions satisfied, the most important of which is achieving a certain level 
of development in the financial market, above all in the government securities market.
In the last few years, certain positive steps have been taken in coordination, but 
still this is not enough. Although there are formal provisions concerning coordination in 
Croatia, in practice they are not implemented consistently, and from this point of view 
both Finance Ministry and CNB should put in extra efforts. The first step in this direc-
tion should be the achievement of an at least approximate consensus about the optimum 181
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combination of fiscal and monetary policy. The next step should be the establishment of 
mechanisms for the regular exchange of data between the CNB and the Finance Minis-
try for the sake of harmonising fiscal and monetary policy. In line with this, the Finance 
Ministry and the CNB should jointly work out an agreement with which as the competent 
bodies of the state they can officially create such a mechanism.
Both these bodies should put extra efforts into encouraging the government securities 
market. By introducing open market operations the CNB set out in this direction, and the 
Finance Ministry by creating new instruments should make use of the great financial po-
tentials of the retail sector and accordingly give a fillip to the government securities mar-
ket. It has been seen that existing instruments do not meet the requirements of even the big 
institutional investors, and the development of new instruments is necessary, adjusted to 
the needs of all potential investors. In this manner the shallow market for government se-
curities will be deepened. Since in the last few years every new issue of government bonds 
showed that the market was crying out for new securities, it is certain that the conditions 
of new issues will be ever more favourable for the government, which should consider-
ably contribute to easier public debt management and lower servicing costs. In order to 
foster the development of the government securities market and greater liquidity in it the 
Finance Ministry and the CNB should together develop a system of primary government 
securities dealers, which has been proved highly effective in many countries.
When the market for government securities develops enough, the importance of for-
mal coordination of public debt management and the running of monetary policy will de-
cline, for this coordination will be achieved via market mechanisms.
It can be concluded that the introduction of open market operations in April 2005 was 
also a good step towards improving coordination in management of the public debt and the 
running of monetary policy, for since then the interest rates on the interbank market have 
oscillated far less and are at a lower level. The demand for treasury bills and bonds is ever 
greater, and data shown in the paper have already shown that stabilisation of the interest 
rates on the interbank market led to stabilisation of interest rates on the government secu-
rities market too, which should provide greater predictability in planning debt management 
costs. Still, it has to be said that for the making of final decisions about the effects of the in-
troduction of OMO on the policy of debt management a more detailed analysis is required, 
and the CNB and the Finance Ministry could together carry out such an analysis and show 
what possibilities there are for the further development of open market operations.
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